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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 94-226
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FLORIDA BAR, PETITIONER v. WENT FOR IT,
INC., and JOHN T. BLAKELY
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the eleventh circuit
[June 21, 1995]

  Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court.
  Rules of the Florida Bar prohibit personal injury
lawyers from sending targeted direct-mail solicitations to
victims and their relatives for 30 days following an
accident or disaster.  This case asks us to consider
whether such rules violate the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution.  We hold that in the
circumstances presented here, they do not.

                      I
  In 1989, the Florida Bar completed a 2-year study of
the effects of lawyer advertising on public opinion.  After
conducting hearings, commissioning surveys, and
reviewing extensive public commentary, the Bar deter-
mined that several changes to its advertising rules were
in order.  In late 1990, the Florida Supreme Court
adopted the Bar's proposed amendments with some
modifications.  The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-Advertising Issues,
571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1990).  Two of these amendments
are at issue in this case.  Rule 4-7.4(b)(1) provides that
-[a] lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be
sent, . . . a written communication to a prospective
client for the purpose of obtaining professional employ-
ment if: (A) the written communication concerns an
action for personal injury or wrongful death or otherwise
relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to
whom the communication is addressed or a relative of
that person, unless the accident or disaster occurred
more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the communi-
cation.-  Rule 4-7.8(a) states that -[a] lawyer shall not
accept referrals from a lawyer referral service unless the
service: (1) engages in no communication with the public
and in no direct contact with prospective clients in a
manner that would violate the Rules of Professional
Conduct if the communication or contact were made by
the lawyer.-  Together, these rules create a brief 30-day
blackout period after an accident during which lawyers
may not, directly or indirectly, single out accident
victims or their relatives in order to solicit their
business.
  In March 1992, G. Stewart McHenry and his wholly
owned lawyer referral service, Went For It, Inc., filed
this action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida challenging Rules 4.7-4(b)(1) and 4.7-8 as
violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution.  McHenry alleged that he routinely sent
targeted solicitations to accident victims or their survi-
vors within 30 days after accidents and that he wished
to continue doing so in the future.  Went For It, Inc.
represented that it wished to contact accident victims or
their survivors within 30 days of accidents and to refer
potential clients to participating Florida lawyers.  In
October 1992, McHenry was disbarred for reasons
unrelated to this suit, The Florida Bar v. McHenry, 605
So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1992).  Another Florida lawyer, John T.
Blakely, was substituted in his stead.
  The District Court referred the parties' competing
summary judgment motions to a Magistrate Judge, who
concluded that the Florida Bar had substantial govern-
ment interests, predicated on a concern for professional-
ism, both in protecting the personal privacy and tran-
quility of recent accident victims and their relatives and
in ensuring that these individuals do not fall prey to
undue influence or overreaching.  Citing the Florida
Bar's extensive study, the Magistrate Judge found that
the rules directly serve those interests and sweep no
further than reasonably necessary.  The Magistrate
recommended that the District Court grant the Florida
Bar's motion for summary judgment on the ground that
the rules pass constitutional muster.
  The District Court rejected the Magistrate Judge's
report and recommendations and entered summary
judgment for the plaintiffs, 808 F. Supp. 1543 (MD Fla.
1992), relying on Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U. S. 350 (1977), and subsequent cases.  The Eleventh
Circuit affirmed on similar grounds, 21 F. 3d 1038
(1994).  The panel noted, in its conclusion, that it was
-disturbed that Bates and its progeny require the
decision- that it reached, 21 F. 3d, at 1045.  We granted
certiorari, 512 U. S. ___ (1994), and now reverse.

                     II

                      A
  Constitutional protection for attorney advertising, and
for commercial speech generally, is of recent vintage.
Until the mid-1970s, we adhered to the broad rule laid
out in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U. S. 52, 54 (1942),
that, while the First Amendment guards against govern-
ment restriction of speech in most contexts, -the Consti-
tution imposes no such restraint on government as
respects purely commercial advertising.-  In 1976, the
Court changed course.  In Virginia State Bd. of Pharm-
acy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S.
748, we invalidated a state statute barring pharmacists
from advertising prescription drug prices.  At issue was
speech that involved the idea that -I will sell you the X
prescription drug at the Y price.-  Id., at 761.  Striking
the ban as unconstitutional, we rejected the argument
that such speech -is so removed from `any exposition of
ideas,' and from `truth, science, morality, and arts in
general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the
administration of Government,' that it lacks all protec-
tion.-  Id., at 762 (citations omitted).
  In Virginia State Board, the Court limited its holding
to advertising by pharmacists, noting that -[p]hysicians
and lawyers . . . do not dispense standardized products;
they render professional services of almost infinite
variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced
possibility for confusion and deception if they were to
undertake certain kinds of advertising.-  Id., at 773,
n. 25.  One year later, however, the Court applied the
Virginia State Board principles to invalidate a state rule
prohibiting lawyers from advertising in newspapers and
other media.  In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra,
the Court struck a ban on price advertising for what it
deemed -routine- legal services: -the uncontested divorce,
the simple adoption, the uncontested personal bankrupt-
cy, the change of name, and the like.-  Id., at 372.
Expressing confidence that legal advertising would only
be practicable for such simple, standardized services, the
Court rejected the State's proffered justifications for
regulation.
  Nearly two decades of cases have built upon the
foundation laid by Bates.  It is now well established that
lawyer advertising is commercial speech and, as such, is
accorded a measure of First Amendment protection.  See,
e. g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn., 486 U. S. 466, 472
(1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U. S. 626, 637 (1985); In re
R. M. J., 455 U. S. 191, 199 (1982).  Such First Amend-
ment protection, of course, is not absolute.  We have
always been careful to distinguish commercial speech
from speech at the First Amendment's core.  -`[C]om-
mercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection,
commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale
of First Amendment values,' and is subject to `modes of
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of
noncommercial expression.'-  Board of Trustees of State
University of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 477 (1989),
quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447,
456 (1978).  We have observed that -`[t]o require a
parity of constitutional protection for commercial and
noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply
by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's
guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech.'-
492 U. S., at 481, quoting Ohralik, supra, at 456.
  Mindful of these concerns, we engage in -intermediate-
scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech, analyzing
them under the framework set forth in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of N. Y.,
447 U. S. 557 (1980).  Under Central Hudson, the
government may freely regulate commercial speech that
concerns unlawful activity or is misleading.  Id., at
563-564.  Commercial speech that falls into neither of
those categories, like the advertising at issue here, may
be regulated if the government satisfies a test consisting
of three related prongs: first, the government must
assert a substantial interest in support of its regulation;
second, the government must demonstrate that the
restriction on commercial speech directly and materially
advances that interest; and third, the regulation must be
-`narrowly drawn,'- id., at 564-565.

                      B
  -Unlike rational basis review, the Central Hudson
standard does not permit us to supplant the precise
interests put forward by the State with other supposi-
tions,- Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U. S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip
op., at 6).  The Florida Bar asserts that it has a
substantial interest in protecting the privacy and
tranquility of personal injury victims and their loved
ones against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers.
See Brief for Petitioner 8, 25-27; 21 F. 3d, at
1043-1044.  This interest obviously factors into the
Bar's paramount (and repeatedly professed) objective of
curbing activities that -negatively affec[t] the administra-
tion of justice.-  The Florida Bar: Petition to Amend the
Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-Advertising Issues,
571 So. 2d, at 455; see also Brief for Petitioner 7, 14,
24; 21 F. 3d, at 1043 (describing Bar's effort -to preserve
the integrity of the legal profession-).  Because direct
mail solicitations in the wake of accidents are perceived
by the public as intrusive, the Bar argues, the reputa-
tion of the legal profession in the eyes of Floridians has
suffered commensurately.  See Pet. for Cert. 14-15; Brief
for Petitioner 28-29.  The regulation, then, is an effort
to protect the flagging reputations of Florida lawyers by
preventing them from engaging in conduct that, the Bar
maintains, -`is universally regarded as deplorable and
beneath common decency because of its intrusion upon
the special vulnerability and private grief of victims or
their families.'-  Brief for Petitioner 28, quoting In re
Anis, 126 N. J. 448, 458, 599 A. 2d 1265, 1270 (1992).
  We have little trouble crediting the Bar's interest as
substantial.  On various occasions we have accepted the
proposition that -States have a compelling interest in
the practice of professions within their boundaries, and
. . . as part of their power to protect the public health,
safety, and other valid interests they have broad power
to establish standards for licensing practitioners and
regulating the practice of professions.-  Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773, 792 (1975); see also
Ohralik, supra, at 460; Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U. S. 117,
124 (1961).  Our precedents also leave no room for doubt
that -the protection of potential clients' privacy is a
substantial state interest.-  See Edenfield, supra, at ___
(slip op., at 7).  In other contexts, we have consistently
recognized that -[t]he State's interest in protecting the
well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is
certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized
society.-  Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 471 (1980).
Indeed, we have noted that -a special benefit of the
privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls, which
the State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid
intrusions.-  Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 484-485
(1988).
  Under Central Hudson's second prong, the State must
demonstrate that the challenged regulation -advances
the Government's interest `in a direct and material
way.'-  Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U. S. ___, ___
(1995) (slip op., at 10), quoting Edenfield, supra, at ___.
That burden, we have explained, -`is not satisfied by
mere speculation and conjecture; rather, a governmental
body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial
speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are
real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to
a material degree.'-  514 U. S., at ___, quoting
Edenfield, supra, at ___.  In Edenfield, the Court
invalidated a Florida ban on in-person solicitation by
certified public accountants (CPAs).  We observed that
the State Board of Accountancy had -present[ed] no
studies that suggest personal solicitation of prospective
business clients by CPAs creates the dangers of fraud,
overreaching, or compromised independence that the
Board claims to fear.-  Edenfield, supra, at ___ (slip op.,
at 9).  Moreover, -[t]he record [did] not disclose any
anecdotal evidence, either from Florida or another State,
that validate[d] the Board's suppositions.-  Ibid.  In fact,
we concluded that the only evidence in the record tended
to -contradic[t] rather than strengthe[n] the Board's
submissions.-  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10).  Finding
nothing in the record to substantiate the State's allega-
tions of harm, we invalidated the regulation.
  The direct-mail solicitation regulation before us does
not suffer from such infirmities.  The Florida Bar
submitted a 106-page summary of its 2-year study of
lawyer advertising and solicitation to the District Court.
That summary contains data-both statistical and
anecdotal-supporting the Bar's contentions that the
Florida public views direct-mail solicitations in the
immediate wake of accidents as an intrusion on privacy
that reflects poorly upon the profession.  As of June
1989, lawyers mailed 700,000 direct solicitations in
Florida annually, 40% of which were aimed at accident
victims or their survivors.  Summary of the Record in
No. 74, 987 (Fla.) on Petition to Amend the Rules
Regulating Lawyer Advertising (hereinafter Summary of
Record), App. H, p. 2.  A survey of Florida adults
commissioned by the Bar indicated that Floridians -have
negative feelings about those attorneys who use direct
mail advertising.-  Magid Associates, Attitudes &
Opinions Toward Direct Mail Advertising by Attorneys
(Dec. 1987), Summary of Record, App. C(4), p. 6.  Fifty-
four percent of the general population surveyed said that
contacting persons concerning accidents or similar events
is a violation of privacy.  Id., at 7.  A random sampling
of persons who received direct-mail advertising from
lawyers in 1987 revealed that 45% believed that direct-
mail solicitation is -designed to take advantage of
gullible or unstable people-; 34% found such tactics
-annoying or irritating-; 26% found it -an invasion of
your privacy-; and 24% reported that it -made you
angry.-  Ibid.  Significantly, 27% of direct-mail recipients
reported that their regard for the legal profession and
for the judicial process as a whole was -lower- as a
result of receiving the direct mail.  Ibid.
  The anecdotal record mustered by the Bar is notewor-
thy for its breadth and detail.  With titles like -Scaven-
ger Lawyers- (The Miami Herald, Sept. 29, 1987) and
-Solicitors Out of Bounds- (St. Petersburg Times, Oct.
26, 1987), newspaper editorial pages in Florida have
burgeoned with criticism of Florida lawyers who send
targeted direct mail to victims shortly after accidents.
See Summary of Record, App. B, pp. 1-8 (excerpts from
articles); see also Peltz, Legal Advertising-Opening
Pandora's Box, 19 Stetson L. Rev. 43, 116 (1989) (listing
Florida editorials critical of direct-mail solicitation of
accident victims in 1987, several of which are referenced
in the record).  The study summary also includes page
upon page of excerpts from complaints of direct-mail
recipients.  For example, a Florida citizen described how
he was -`appalled and angered by the brazen attempt'-
of a law firm to solicit him by letter shortly after he
was injured and his fiancee was killed in an auto
accident.  Summary of Record, App. I(1), p. 2.  Another
found it -`despicable and inexcusable'- that a Pensacola
lawyer wrote to his mother three days after his father's
funeral.  Ibid.  Another described how she was -`as-
tounded'- and then -`very angry'- when she received a
solicitation following a minor accident.  Id., at 3.  Still
another described as -`beyond comprehension'- a letter
his nephew's family received the day of the nephew's
funeral.  Ibid.  One citizen wrote, -`I consider the
unsolicited contact from you after my child's accident to
be of the rankest form of ambulance chasing and in
incredibly poor taste. . . .  I cannot begin to express
with my limited vocabulary the utter contempt in which
I hold you and your kind.'-  Ibid.
  In light of this showing-which respondents at no time
refuted, save by the conclusory assertion that the rule
lacked -any factual basis,- Plaintiffs' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment and Supplementary Memorandum of
Law in No. 92-370-Civ. (MD Fla.), p. 5--we conclude that
the Bar has satisfied the second prong of the Central
Hudson test.  In dissent, Justice Kennedy complains
that we have before us few indications of the sample
size or selection procedures employed by Magid Associ-
ates (a nationally renowned consulting firm) and no
copies of the actual surveys employed.  See post, at 6.
As stated, we believe the evidence adduced by the Bar
is sufficient to meet the standard elaborated in
Edenfield, supra.  In any event, we do not read our case
law to require that empirical data come to us accompa-
nied by a surfeit of background information.  Indeed, in
other First Amendment contexts, we have permitted
litigants to justify speech restrictions by reference to
studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales
altogether, see City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U. S. 41, 50-51 (1986); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
501 U. S. 560, 584-585 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring in
the judgment), or even, in a case applying strict scru-
tiny, to justify restrictions based solely on history, consen-
sus, and -simple common sense,- Burson v. Freeman, 504
U. S. 191, 211 (1992).  Nothing in Edenfield, supra, a
case in which the State offered no evidence or anecdotes
in support of its restriction, requires more.  After
scouring the record, we are satisfied that the ban on
direct-mail solicitation in the immediate aftermath of
accidents, unlike the rule at issue in Edenfield, targets
a concrete, nonspeculative harm.
  In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of
Appeals determined that this case was governed squarely
by Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn., 486 U. S. 466
(1988).  Making no mention of the Bar's study, the court
concluded that -`a targeted letter [does not] invade the
recipient's privacy any more than does a substantively
identical letter mailed at large.  The invasion, if any,
occurs when the lawyer discovers the recipient's legal
affairs, not when he confronts the recipient with the
discovery.'- 21 F. 3d, at 1044, quoting Shapero, supra,
at 476.  In many cases, the Court of Appeals explained,
-this invasion of privacy will involve no more than
reading the newspaper.-  21 F. 3d, at 1044.
  While some of Shapero's language might be read to
support the Court of Appeals' interpretation, Shapero
differs in several fundamental respects from the case
before us.  First and foremost, Shapero's treatment of
privacy was casual.  Contrary to the dissent's sugges-
tions, post, at 3, the State in Shapero did not seek to
justify its regulation as a measure undertaken to
prevent lawyers' invasions of privacy interests.  See
generally Brief for Respondent in Shapero v. Kentucky
Bar Assn., O. T. 1987, No. 87-16.  Rather, the State
focused exclusively on the special dangers of overreach-
ing inhering in targeted solicitations.  Ibid.  Second, in
contrast to this case, Shapero dealt with a broad ban on
all direct-mail solicitations, whatever the time frame and
whoever the recipient.  Finally, the State in Shapero
assembled no evidence attempting to demonstrate any
actual harm caused by targeted direct mail.  The Court
rejected the State's effort to justify a prophylactic ban on
the basis of blanket, untested assertions of undue
influence and overreaching.  486 U. S., at 475.  Because
the State did not make a privacy-based argument at all,
its empirical showing on that issue was similarly infirm.
  We find the Court's perfunctory treatment of privacy
in Shapero to be of little utility in assessing this ban on
targeted solicitation of victims in the immediate after-
math of accidents.  While it is undoubtedly true that
many people find the image of lawyers sifting through
accident and police reports in pursuit of prospective
clients unpalatable and invasive, this case targets a
different kind of intrusion.  The Florida Bar has argued,
and the record reflects, that a principal purpose of the
ban is -protecting the personal privacy and tranquility
of [Florida's] citizens from crass commercial intrusion by
attorneys upon their personal grief in times of trauma.-
Brief for Petitioner 8; cf. Summary of Record, App. I(1)
(citizen commentary describing outrage at lawyers'
timing in sending solicitation letters).  The intrusion
targeted by the Bar's regulation stems not from the fact
that a lawyer has learned about an accident or disaster
(as the Court of Appeals notes, in many instances a
lawyer need only read the newspaper to glean this
information), but from the lawyer's confrontation of
victims or relatives with such information, while wounds
are still open, in order to solicit their business.  In this
respect, an untargeted letter mailed to society at large
is different in kind from a targeted solicitation; the
untargeted letter involves no willful or knowing affront
to or invasion of the tranquility of bereaved or injured
individuals and simply does not cause the same kind of
reputational harm to the profession unearthed by the
Florida Bar's study.
  Nor do we find Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,
463 U. S. 60 (1983), dispositive of the issue, despite any
superficial resemblance.  In Bolger, we rejected the
Federal Government's paternalistic effort to ban poten-
tially -offensive- and -intrusive- direct-mail advertise-
ments for contraceptives.  Minimizing the Government's
allegations of harm, we reasoned that -[r]ecipients of
objectionable mailings . . . may `effectively avoid further
bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting
their eyes.'-  Id., at 72, quoting Cohen v. California, 403
U. S. 15, 21 (1971).  We found that the -`short, though
regular, journey from mail box to trash can . . . is an
acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution is
concerned.'-  463 U. S., at 72 (ellipses in original),
quoting Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269
F. Supp. 880, 883 (SDNY), summarily aff'd, 386 F. 2d
449 (CA2 1967).  Concluding that citizens have at their
disposal ample means of averting any substantial injury
inhering in the delivery of objectionable contraceptive
material, we deemed the State's intercession unnecessary
and unduly restrictive.
  Here, in contrast, the harm targeted by the Florida
Bar cannot be eliminated by a brief journey to the trash
can.  The purpose of the 30-day targeted direct-mail ban
is to forestall the outrage and irritation with the state-
licensed legal profession that the practice of direct
solicitation only days after accidents has engendered.
The Bar is concerned not with citizens' -offense- in the
abstract, see post, at 4-5, but with the demonstrable
detrimental effects that such -offense- has on the
profession it regulates.  See Brief for Petitioner 7, 14,
24, 28.  Moreover, the harm posited by the Bar is as
much a function of simple receipt of targeted solicita-
tions within days of accidents as it is a function of the
letters' contents.  Throwing the letter away shortly after
opening it may minimize the latter intrusion, but it does
little to combat the former.  We see no basis in Bolger,
nor in the other, similar cases cited by the dissent, post,
at 4-5, for dismissing the Florida Bar's assertions of
harm, particularly given the unrefuted empirical and
anecdotal basis for the Bar's conclusions.
  Passing to Central Hudson's third prong, we examine
the relationship between the Florida Bar's interests and
the means chosen to serve them.  See Board of Trustees
of State University of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U. S., at 480.
With respect to this prong, the differences between
commercial speech and noncommercial speech are
manifest.  In Fox, we made clear that the -least restric-
tive means- test has no role in the commercial speech
context.  Ibid.  -What our decisions require,- instead, -is
a `fit' between the legislature's ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends,' a fit that is not
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not
necessarily the single best disposition but one whose
scope is `in proportion to the interest served,' that
employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but
. . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired
objective.-  Ibid. (citations omitted).  Of course, we do
not equate this test with the less rigorous obstacles of
rational basis review; in Cincinnati v. Discovery Net-
work, Inc., 507 U. S. ___, ___, n. 13 (1993) (slip op., at
7, n. 13), for example, we observed that the existence of
-numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to
the restriction on commercial speech . . . is certainly a
relevant consideration in determining whether the `fit'
between ends and means is reasonable.-
  Respondents levy a great deal of criticism, echoed in
the dissent, post, at 8-10, at the scope of the Bar's
restriction on targeted mail.  -[B]y prohibiting written
communications to all people, whatever their state of
mind,- respondents charge, the rule -keeps useful
information from those accident victims who are ready,
willing and able to utilize a lawyer's advice.-  Brief for
Respondents 14.  This criticism may be parsed into two
components.  First, the rule does not distinguish
between victims in terms of the severity of their inju-
ries.  According to respondents, the rule is unconsti-
tutionally overinclusive insofar as it bans targeted
mailings even to citizens whose injuries or grief are
relatively minor.  Id., at 15.  Second, the rule may
prevent citizens from learning about their legal options,
particularly at a time when other actors-opposing
counsel and insurance adjusters-may be clamoring for
victims' attentions.  Any benefit arising from the Bar's
regulation, respondents implicitly contend, is outweighed
by these costs.
  We are not persuaded by respondents' allegations of
constitutional infirmity.  We find little deficiency in the
ban's failure to distinguish among injured Floridians by
the severity of their pain or the intensity of their grief.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine the contours of a regula-
tion that might satisfy respondents on this score.
Rather than drawing difficult lines on the basis that
some injuries are -severe- and some situations appropri-
ate (and others, presumably, inappropriate) for grief,
anger, or emotion, the Florida Bar has crafted a ban
applicable to all postaccident or disaster solicitations for
a brief 30-day period.  Unlike respondents, we do not
see -numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives-
to Florida's short temporal ban.  Cincinnati, supra, at
___, n. 13 (slip op., at 7, n. 13).  The Bar's rule is
reasonably well-tailored to its stated objective of elimi-
nating targeted mailings whose type and timing are a
source of distress to Floridians, distress that has caused
many of them to lose respect for the legal profession.
  Respondents' second point would have force if the
Bar's rule were not limited to a brief period and if there
were not many other ways for injured Floridians to
learn about the availability of legal representation
during that time.  Our lawyer advertising cases have
afforded lawyers a great deal of leeway to devise
innovative ways to attract new business.  Florida
permits lawyers to advertise on prime-time television
and radio as well as in newspapers and other media.
They may rent space on billboards.  They may send
untargeted letters to the general population, or to
discrete segments thereof.  There are, of course, pages
upon pages devoted to lawyers in the Yellow Pages of
Florida telephone directories.  These listings are orga-
nized alphabetically and by area of specialty.  See
generally Rule 4-7.2(a), Rules Regulating The Florida
Bar (-[A] lawyer may advertise services through public
media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory,
newspaper or other periodical, billboards and other
signs, radio, television, and recorded messages the public
may access by dialing a telephone number, or through
written communication not involving solicitation as
defined in rule 4-7.4-); The Florida Bar: Petition to
Amend the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar-Advertis-
ing Issues, 571 So. 2d, at 461.  These ample alternative
channels for receipt of information about the availability
of legal representation during the 30-day period follow-
ing accidents may explain why, despite the ample
evidence, testimony, and commentary submitted by those
favoring (as well as opposing) unrestricted direct-mail
solicitation, respondents have not pointed to-and we
have not independently found-a single example of an
individual case in which immediate solicitation helped to
avoid, or failure to solicit within 30 days brought about,
the harms that concern the dissent, see post, at 9.  In
fact, the record contains considerable empirical survey
information suggesting that Floridians have little
difficulty finding lawyers when they need one.  See,
e. g., Summary of Record, App. C(4), p. 7; id., App. C(5),
p. 8.  Finding no basis to question the commonsense
conclusion that the many alternative channels for
communicating necessary information about attorneys
are sufficient, we see no defect in Florida's regulation.

                     III
  Speech by professionals obviously has many dimen-
sions.  There are circumstances in which we will accord
speech by attorneys on public issues and matters of legal
representation the strongest protection our Constitution
has to offer.  See, e. g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,
501 U. S. 1030 (1991); In re Primus, 436 U. S. 412
(1978).  This case, however, concerns pure commercial
advertising, for which we have always reserved a lesser
degree of protection under the First Amendment.
Particularly because the standards and conduct of state-
licensed lawyers have traditionally been subject to
extensive regulation by the States, it is all the more
appropriate that we limit our scrutiny of state regula-
tions to a level commensurate with the -`subordinate
position'- of commercial speech in the scale of First
Amendment values.  Fox, 492 U. S., at 477, quoting
Ohralik, 436 U. S., at 456.
  We believe that the Florida Bar's 30-day restriction on
targeted direct-mail solicitation of accident victims and
their relatives withstands scrutiny under the three-part
Central Hudson test that we have devised for this
context.  The Bar has substantial interest both in
protecting injured Floridians from invasive conduct by
lawyers and in preventing the erosion of confidence in
the profession that such repeated invasions have
engendered.  The Bar's proffered study, unrebutted by
respondents below, provides evidence indicating that the
harms it targets are far from illusory.  The palliative
devised by the Bar to address these harms is narrow
both in scope and in duration.  The Constitution, in our
view, requires nothing more.
  The judgment of the Court of Appeals, accordingly, is
reversed.